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NOTES
TRACING THE "WALL": RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL
SYSTEM*
Adopting Jefferson's oft-embellished metaphor, the Supreme Court has
held that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution erects "a
wall of separation between Church and State."1 By incorporating this barrier
into the Fourteenth Amendment, 2 the Court has become final arbiter in an
area which has long perplexed state tribunals applying similar constitutional
provisions.8 One of the most confusing regions through which the wall must
be'traced is the public school system. In a recent decision, People of the State
of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education of School District No, 71,
Champaign County,4 the Court announced two general principles applicable
in this field, but did little to provide a standard by which the constitutionality
of diverse religious practices could be measured.
The McCollum case involved the Champaign, Illinois version of "released
time", a system which in various forms has been adopted by approximately
2,200 communities.5 The core of all such programs is the "release" of students
by the public school, upon parental request, to attend religious classes for a
* People of State of Illinois ex re. McCollum v. Board of Education of School District
No. 71, Champaign County, Ill., 68 S.Ct. 461 (1948).
This Note deals only with the constitutionality of religious and quasi-religious ac-
tivities in the public schools. For a list of studies discussing their desirability, pro and
con, see id. at 473 n.20. The parallel problem of state aid to parochial schools has already
been widely discussed. See, e.g., Notes, 60 HARv. L. Rzv. 793 (1947), 45 Mici-. L. REV.
1001 (1947), 22 Nonm DAmz LAw. 400 (1947).
1. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878); 8 Tix WRaTINGS or
THOmAS JEFFERsoN 113 (Washington ed. 1861).
2. The process was accomplished in two stages, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303 (1940) (prohibiting state action abridging religious freedom), and Everson v.
Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (prohibiting state "estab-
lishment of religion"). It was vaguely foreshadowed by dicta in Meyer v. State of Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), and Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California,
293 U.S. 245, 265 (1934) (concurring opinion by Cardozo, J.).
3. All of the state constitutions include some equivalent of the First Amendment,
usually in much greater detail. E.g., ILI. CONST. Art. II, § 3, Art. VIII, § 3. These pro-
visions are indexed in 3 REPORT OF THE NEw YORE STATE CoNsTITuTIoNAL CONVENTION
Comnm 1766-7, 1799 (1938). And see Note, 96 U. oF PA. L. REv. 230, 234-5 (1947).
For examples of the dissimilarity of state court decisions, see Notes, 5 A.L.R. 866 (1920),
141 A.L.R. 1144 (1942).
4. 68 S. Ct. 461 (1948).
5. The growth of this movement is described id. at 470-2. For a survey of the vari-
ous forms in which "released time" now operates, see the studies listed id. at 472 n. 17,
and DAvis, WEEKDAY CLAssES IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION (U.S. Office of Education, Bul-
letin, No. 3, 1941). Approximately 2,000,000 pupils participate in these programs. 1947
YEARnOOz, INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 76 (1947).
short period each week; absences are reported to the school, and pupils not
participating must continue their secular studies. In Champaign, the Board of
Education had integrated "released time" far more closely with the school
system, permitting sectarian instructors to conduct separate sessions for Catho-
lic, Jewish, and Protestant groups in regular classrooms during school hours.0
A writ of mandamus ordering the Board to abolish this program was sought
by an atheist parent whose son wvas the only member of his class not partici-
pating therein. Finding no direct or appreciable expense to the state and no
unconstitutional incursion on the petitioner's religious freedom, the Illinois
courts denied the writ.7
On appeal, this holding was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United
States in an 8-i decision which evoked four opinions. Speaking for the major-
ity, Mr. Justice Black relied on the Court's dicta in Everson v. Board of
Education of Ewing Township, where the First Amendment's amorphous pro-
-vision against laws "respecting the establishment of religion" had been
moulded into a firm prohibition: "Neither a state nor the Federal Govern-
ment . . . can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to
remain away from church against his will. ... No tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions. . ... 8
Laying these dicta beside the Champaign plan, the majority found that the
two dearly did not square: (1) tax-supported buildings were being "used for
the dissemination of religious doctrines"; (2) the State "affords sectarian
groups an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their religious
classes through use of the state's compulsory public school machinery. ' Such
6. There was a high degree of cooperation between the Board and the sponsoring
interdenominational religious council. In addition to checking attendance, public school
teachers distributed cards on which parents gave permission for their children to par-
ticipate; religious instructors, while provided and paid by the council, were subject to ap-
proval by the superintendent of schools; students not attending the Protestant classes were
required to leave the classroom during that period. McCollurm case, supra note 4 at 463-4.
The Champaign program, despite its joint sponsorship, encountercd opposition from
several sectarian groups, including Baptists, Jews, and Seventh Day Adventists, which
filed briefs opposing the program. Id. at 473 n. 19. No Jewish classes had been held for
several years. Id. at 464.
7. 396 IM. 14, 71 N.E. 2d 161 (1947). The only costs to the school, wear and tear
of furniture and negligible use of the teacher's time in handling attendance records, were
discounted as de sninmis. Id. at 24-5, 71 N.E. 2d at 165-6. The court rejected charges
that pupils not participating were unconstitutionally "segregated" and embarrassed, hold-
ing that use of regular classrooms did not distinguish the case from People ex rel. Latimer
v. Board of Education of Chicago, 394 Ill. 228, 68 N.E. 2d 305 (1946) ("released time"
outside schoolbuildings upheld). McCollum case, .upra at 19-23, 71 N.E. 2d at 164-5.
Allegations that the Board of Education was exercising its discretion unconstitutionally
were summarily dismissed. Id. at 27-8, 71 N.E. 2d at 167-8.
8. See 330 U.S. 1, 15-6 (1947) (discussed p. 1116 infra). The dissenting Justices had
also embraced this principle. Id. at 41, 42-3, 59-60.
* 9. Mcollum case, supra note 4 at 465-6. The only amplifications of these conclu-
sions were statements that school authorities cooperated closely with the religious council,
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a conclusion made it unnecessary to consider allegations that rights of religious
freedom or equality were restricted, and Mr. Justice Black carefully refrained
from enumerating the specific elements which lay beyond the constitutional
pale.' 0 These omissions raised problems of predictability, which were in-
tensified by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a separate opinion stressing the ad
hoc nature of the Court's holding.-" Justices Rutledge and Burton further
beclouded the crystal ball by joining in both opinions, while Mr. Justice Jack-
son not only concurred with Mr. Justice Frankfurter but also opined that the
Court should have rejected the appeal on jurisdictional grounds.' 2 Only Mr.
Justice Reed, however, failed to agree that the Champaign program came
within the prohibition of the Everson dicta.13
If the "wall of separation" followed an unswerving line, the reticence of the
majority and qualifications by concurring Justices would be relatively im-
material, for logical extension of the two majority doctrines would seem to
foreclose any religious activity in public buildings or during school hours,
14
But this judicial masonry, while it may be "impregnable",', has already proved
far from immovable. In the Everson case itself, the majority expediently
shifted the locus of its newly-erected wall to uphold state payment of bus-
fares to children attending parochial schools, as serving a valid "public pur-
pose", even though these schools were incidentally benefitted thereby.' 0 The
that the school system was "integrated with the program", and that"pupils compelled by
law to go to school for secular education are released in part from their legal duty." Id.
at 464.
10. McCollum case, supra note 4 at 463 n. 1, 464. And see note 9 Viupra.
11. Id. at 466. Concluding that religious education in Champaign was "patently
woven into the working scheme of the school," the Justice nevertheless cautioned that
"different forms which 'releasd time' has taken . . .may be found unexceptionable." Id.
at 473, 475. He listed aspects in which the programs differ, id. at 472 n, 17, but did not
indicate which, if any, were innocuous.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter concluded his dissertation with the time-honored proverb
quoted by Robert Frost, "Good fences make good neighbors." He might appropriately have
added the first line of that poem, "Something there is that doesn't love a wall."
12. Id. at 475. Mr. Justice Jackson based his jurisdictional argument on findings that
the program did not involve additional taxes or restrictions on religious freedom, and
warned against interfering with local schools in the absence of these two elements, See
note 43 infra. Since the complaint sought abolition of all religious teaching, he also ob-
jected to remanding the case without expressly limiting the Court's decision to "released
time". Id. at 476.
13. Id. at 478. See p. 1121 infra. The Justice found it "difficult to extract from the
opinions any conclusions as to what is in the Champaign plan that is unconstitutional,"
id. at 479, and remarked that "a rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of speech."
Id. at 482.
14. The same result would be achieved by stringent application of the Evcrson dicta.
See Note, 47 CoL L. REv. 1346 (1947).
15. See note 17 infra.
16. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Five Justices, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, admitted
that these payments "undoubtedly" facilitated attendance of children who otherwise might
not have gone to parochial schools, but held nevertheless that such legislation "does no
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possibility that the Court may find similar deviations desirable to preserve
borderline religious influences in public schools raises the problem of whether
such practices can be logically reconciled with the McCollum decision.
Where, as in the Everson case, some overriding "public purpose" can be de-
tected, exceptions are easily employed in bending the wall to preserve practices
not specifically outlawed by the McCollum doctrine. 7 In the name of "cultural
education", for instance, the Court could permit the secular study of religious
literature, painting, and music, unless such classes are used as vehicles for
affirmative propagation of religion.' 8 Similarly, courses in comparative the-
ology might well be sanctioned. But this exception would not validate sectarian
influences, such as religious garb for teachers,'0 which lack sufficient cultural
value to justify their presence in the classroom.
While practices directly contrary to the McCollunt enunciations are more
difficult to sustain, the Everson case suggests a method of limiting even the
unqualified statement that tax-supported buildings cannot be used "for the
dissemination of religious doctrines." In many communities, particularly where
no other meeting-houses are available, sundry organizations have been per-
mitted to use school buildings so long as there is no added expense to the
more than... help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and
expeditiously to and from accredited schools." Id. at 17-8. This conclusion reminded Mr.
Justice Jackson of Byron's Julia, who, "whispering 'I will ne'er consent,'-consented."
Id. at 19. Mr. Justice Rutledge, with whom Justices Frankfurter, Jackson and Burton
agreed, dissented on the ground that a criterion of whether child or church vms the pri-
mary recipient of aid (the so-called "child benefit theory") infringed the basic principle
of separation and provided no logical stopping-point. Id. at 28, 29, 47-S.
17. Far from admitting that its holding created an exception, the E'crson majority
insisted that the "wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the
slightest breach. New Jersey has not breached it here." Id. at 18. But since state pay-
ment for transportation reduces the cost of attending a parochial school established to
propagate religious beliefs as well as to provide secular education, it seems unrealistic to
deny that religion is aided thereby. See Mr. Justice Rutledge's dissent, id. at 46. The con-
clusion that incidental aid to religion will not prevent state action to advance the "general
welfare" seems tantamount to an exception from complete separation of Church and State.
18. This type of study does not directly contravene the MfcCollam majority's pro-
hibition against aiding sectarian groups to provide pupils for their religious classes. But
the emotional impact of religious art makes some distinction from the Everson dicta neces-
sary. In his McCollum opinion, supra note 4 at 477, Mr. Justice Jackson stressed the need
for such a distinction and the desirability of such education; the silence of other Justices
on this point may be attributed to the risk of expressio unius est excitsio altcrius.
Classes differ so extensively that each type whuld still have to be judged independ-
ently. It would be questionable, for example, whether the Bible could be used as a text-
book. Compare Pfeiffer v. Board of Education of Detroit, 118 Mich. 560, 77 NAV. 2SO
(1898) (permitting use) with State ex rel. Weiss v. District Board, 76 Wis. 177, 44 N.".
967 (1890) (forbidding such use).
19. State courts have differed on this particular practice. Consparc O'Connor V.
Hendrick, 184 N.Y. 421, 77 N.E. 612 (1906) (upholding order prohibiting such attire as
in line with constitutional policy) with Gerhardt v. Held, 66 N.D. 444, 267 N.A. 127
(1936) (religious garb permitted). The problem usually arises in conjunction with nu-
merous influences, such as a crucifix in the classroom, which have survived the incorpora-
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public or interference with school programs. 20 Invoking the established tenet
that a state should be neutral rather than hostile toward religion,21 the 'Court
might hold that, whenever these buildings are opened to all comers, the state
is offering a public service to which sectarian and secular groups may have
access on equal terms.
22
But the "public purpose" exception seems unavailable to preserve "released
time," even in forms less extensive than the Champaign program. Although
such a system may foster morality or assist parents to educate their children
as they see fit, the McCollum decision indicates that neither of these secular
functions can redeem any version of "released time" which "aids" religion.23
And even a minimum program such as that authorized by statute in New
York,2 which does not utilize public property or approach the Champaign
degree of integration,25 seems to collide with the majority's prohibition against
tion of a parochial school into the public school system. E.g., Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo.
808, 163 S.W. 2d 609 (1941); Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691, 166 N.W. 202
(1918).
20. E.g., Goodman v. Board of Education, 48 Cal. App. 2d 731, 120 P. 2d 665 (1941)
(political meetings); Nichols v. School Directors, 93 Ill. 61, 34 Am. Rep. 160 (1879)
(religious meetings). 8 states have statutes permitting such use for religious as well as
other purposes, e.g., Ium. STAT. c. 122, § 6-43 (Smith-Hurd, 1946), while 16 exclude re-
ligious activities although certain private uses are permitted, e.g., N.Y. Emuc. LAw § 414
(1947). See Note, 161 A.L.R. 1308 (1946).
21. See the McCollum case, supra note 4 at 465; Everson v. Board of Education of
Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
22. See Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947):
"We must be careful ... that we do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from extend-
ing its general state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their religious be-
lie."
23. No other ground for an exception is apparent. The majority opinion was silent
on both functions, but both were as beneficial in the Champaign program as in any other
form of "released time". And regardless of the McCollum decision, arguments based on
these functions seem tenuous. As to morality, see p. 1120 infra. And even though parents
have a constitutional right to send their children to parochial instead of public schools,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), it does not necessarily follow that those
failing to exercise this option can obtain release of their children for religious training
during school hours. The rest of the week is available for religious education, a factor
which distinguishes the Pierce rationale and also the accepted practice of releasing stu-
dents on holy days. The Pierce analogy, moreover, does not justify preferring religion
over any other activity towards which the state is "neutral", a result implicit in the re-
quirement that other students continue their secular studies.
24. See N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 3210 (1947). 11 states (but not Illinois) have similar
statutes, a distinction which may enable programs so authorized to escape at least the
majority's McCollum argument that pupils in Champaign were released from a legal duty
(see note 9 .vpra).
25. See Regulation of the New York State Commissioner of Education, July 4, 1940.
Long before statutory authorization, this program was upheld in People ex rel. Lewis v.
Graves, 245 N.Y. 195, 156 N.E. 663 (1927). In New York City, any announcement con-
cerning the program or comment by teachers on a pupil's attendance at religious classes
are forbidden, although, as in all "released time" programs, attendance reports must still
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employing the compulsory school system to aid in proselyting pupils for re-
ligious classes: religion can compete more successfully with arithmetic than
with recreation, and the benediction of the state is afforded by accepting re-
ligious education in lieu of secular studies.20 Also dubious is the constitution-
ality of drawing lines between sectarian groups during school hours, an element
present in the McCollum case but not discussed by the majority.? While
these objections would not apply if all students were dismissed regardless of
whether they attended the religious classes (a system known as "dismissed
time") ,2 it would be difficult to distinguish any form of "released time" with-
out at least modifying the McCollum doctrineYm
Equally endangered by the majority opinion is the practice, current in
thirty-six states and required by statute in twelve, of reading the King James
Bible and often reciting the Lord's Prayer at school exercises Although
be submitted to the school and students not participating must continue their secular
studies. Rules, Board of Education of the City of New York, Nov. 13, 1940.
26. Such assistance seems to be the primary reason for "released time". See "Villiam-
son, Religion and the Public Schools, The Churchman, August, 1947, p. 10, 11: "The only
construction that can be placed upon Protestant advocacy of sectarianism in public school
education is an admission of weakness.... If Sunday school attendance has fallen off to
an alarming extent, what is the reason for it?"
Letters from a superintendent of schools are often written to exert influence on be-
half of "released time', as in Neosho, Mo.: "The officials of the public schools heartily
endorse the program of the Week-Day Church School. They believe it will contribute
much to the cultural, moral, and spiritual life of your child." Quoted in DAvis, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 39.
27. The majority expressly dismissed this question as unnecessary to the decision.
McCollum case, supra note 4 at 463 n. 1. Mr. Justice Frankfurter objected that the
Champaign arrangement unconstitutionally "presents powerful elements of inherent pres-
sure by the school system" and "sharpens the conciousness of religious differences." Id.
at 473; Justices Jackson and Reed, on the other hand, doubted that the Constitution pro-
tects pupils from the "embarrassment that always attends nonconformity' Id. at 476, 4ISO.
Quaere whether the state may assist a program which results in embarrassment for re-
ligious reasons during school hours. See note 33 infra.
28. See DAvis, op. cit. supra note 5, at 22. Under such a program, the alternatives
to religious education are of the individual's own choosing, and there is no school-spon-
sored segregation of those not participating, since everyone is excused.
29. Mr. Justice Reed so interpreted the majority opinion. M1cCollum case, supra note
4 at 479, 485 (1948). But cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion, mipra note 11. For possible
techniques of upholding some forms of "released time", see p. 1121 infra. A decision
favorable to the New York plan would obfuscate the status of programs lying between the
New York and Champaign extremes. Particularly awkward to uphold would be tho:e
which, although not using school buildings, involve direct expenditures by the state for
preparation and mailing of parent request cards. Such programs have been sanctioned,
however, in Gordon v. Board of Education of Los Angeles, 178 P2d 4'8 (Cal. App. 1947),
and People ez rel. Latimer v. Board of Education of Chicago, 394 Ill. 228, 6S N.E2d 305
(1946). Contra: Stein v. Brown, 125 Misc. 692, 211 N.Y.S. 822 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
30. E.g., Aym STAT. § 3614 (Pope, 1937) (daily Bible reading w€ithout comment re-
quired, but children objecting may be excused on parental request). In addition, six other
states specify that the Bible may be read in, or shall not be excluded from, the public schools.
E.g., IND. STAT. § 28-5101 (Bums, 1933). For compilation of these statutes and a sum-
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usually condoned by state courts when attendance is not compulsory and
there is no sectarian comment on the Scriptures,3 ' these exercises seem clearly
contrary to the McCollum rationale: tax-supported property and the school
system are being utilized to provide a forum and audience for ceremonies
essentially religious in nature.32 And even "voluntary" exercises expose non-
participants to religious prejudice to a degree which, as with "released time",
seems to violate at least the spirit of the Everson prohibition against influenc-
ing attendance at church services.3 3 Moreover, directly utilizing religion to
accomplish the public purpose of inculcating moral principles seems constitu-
tionally far more precarious than incidentally "aiding" religion in the process
of performing a purely secular function such as fire prevention 34-although
reluctance to overturn so prevalent a practice may lead the Court to hold
that the morality fostered by these ceremonies expiates their religious content.
And since civic morality is a precept of almost all sects, classifying it as an
overriding justification might open the doctrinal floodgates for infinitely
greater aid to religion.
In the absence of a logically tenable "public purpose", any religious influence
in the public schools must run the gauntlet of the Everson dicta, which are
now enshrined as the Court's official interpretation of the First Amendment.85
Stringent application of these dicta would bar any aid whatsoever to one or all
religions" even if the McCollun enunciations were restricted to the context
of the Champaign program.
One method of qualifying the Everson absolute throughout would be to
mary of diverse practices in various states, see KEESECKER, LEGAL STATUS or BiBmi RwAD-
ING AND RELIGIOUS INsTRUcTION If PUBLIC SCHOOLS 2-10 (U.S. Office of Education,
Bulletin No. 14, 1930). The situation has changed remarkably little since 1930,
31. For a summary of state decisions, see KYEsEcKER, op. cit. supra note 30, at 10-29,
and Notes, 5 A.L.R. 866 (1920), 141 A.L.R. 1144 (1942). For criticism of these decisions,
see Note, 47 CoL. L. REV. 1346 (1947).
32. State courts have usually upheld these practices on grounds that the Bible is not
sectarian, e.g., Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School District, 120 Ky. 608, 631, 87 S.W.
792, 798 (1905) ; see cases in articles listed note 31 supra. But Protestants and Catholics
disagree as to the correct version, while non-Christians would certainly find the New Testa-
ment sectarian. And regardless of this distinction, the Everson test applies even to non-
sectarian religious exercises. Prayers and hymns are by definition religious, while the moral
teachings and literary stature of the Bible do not lessen its religious character.
33. See, e.g., People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education, 245 Ill. 334, 351, 92 N.E.
251, 256 (1910) : "The exclusion of a pupil from this part of the school exercises . . . sub-
jects him to a religious stigma and places him at a disadvantage in the school, which the
law never contemplated." Pressure to attend services of worship seems to come within
the Everson proscription even more completely than similar assistance to religious educa-
tion. See note 27 .rupra.
An incidental casualty of this proscription, if any plebe should decide to start his
military career in a blaze of notoriety, might be compulsory chapel services at West Point.
See Reg. for the U. S. Corps of Cadets 47 (1947).
34. See Note, 47 COL. L. REV. 1346, 1354 (1947).
35. McCollum case, supra note 4 at 465. And see p. 1115 supra.
36. See p. 1115 supra, and Note, 47 COL. L. Rxv. 1346 (1947).
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balance the public benefit in each instance against the aid to religion. Inculca-
tion of moral principles, for instance, may well be found to outweigh the
sectarian nature of New York "released time" or religious exercises, even
though insufficient to qualify as a full-fledged "public purpose" of the Evcrson
variety.37 The distinction between these two approaches is primarily verbal,
for such a balancing is inevitably a major factor in judicial calculations. But
overt acceptance of a completely relative standard would make for even less
predictability than the Everson rationale, which at least assumes the theoreti-
cally objective criterion that aid to religion is permissible only when incidental
to the pursuit of legitimate public activity.38
Even more far-reaching is the method suggested in Mr. Justice Reed's dis-
sent, which would remove the need for any propitiating justification where the
"aid" was merely a "by-product of organized society" and not "purposeful
assistance directly to the church itself or to some religious group . . . per-
forming ecclesiastical functions." 39 Such a modification would transcend
piecemeal exceptions by shifting the entire wall to a position where practices
involving no direct expense to the state, such as "released time" and the use of
public buildings for sectarian meetings, could easily be sustained. And direct
expenditures, which theoretically are barred by the precept that no tax what-
ever can be constitutionally "levied to support religious activities," could be
validated by a parallel definition of the word "support.' 40 While this approach
was not specifically negated by the majority or concurring opinions, the 8-1
decision over Mr. Justice Reed's dissent indicates that the Court would be
reluctant to relax its Eversoix prohibition to such an extent. The essence of
this concept, however, might well be accepted in diluted form by construing
state "neutrality" towards religion, which technically seems to save only those
benefits in which all share,41 broadly enough to uphold desirable types of in-
significant aid which could not be logically sustained on less drastic grounds.4O 2
37. Such a "balancing" approach, which would be less hazardous than adopting
"morality" as grounds for a general exception, might well be employed by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter to support these practices (see note 11 supra), but it has not yet been broached
by the Court.
38. See notes 16 and 17 supra. This doctrinal basis of the "exception" technique
creates precedents which hamper future fle'dbility and afford at least verbal grounds for
prediction, however illusory these may be. See Braden, The Scarcli for Objectitity in
Constitutional Law, 57 YAI.E L. J. 571 (1948).
39. McCollum case, supra note 4 at 483.
40. Mr. Justice Reed seems to include this alteration in his proposal, for he utilizes
his dichotomy between "purposeful assistance" and the "incidental advantages that religious
bodies ... obtain as a by-product of organized society" to preserve all the practices re-
ferred to in note 42 infra, several of which involved direct expense to the state. Id. at
483, 485.
41. See note 22 upra.
42. Eax-amples are providing Chaplains for Congress, and the slogan "In God We
Trust" on coins, neither of which serves any secular purpose. And tax exemption for re-
ligious institutions might be similarly sustained as appropriate to complete separation
between church and state, as well as on grounds that all charitable institutions receive the
19481 1121
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Even without unqualified acceptance of Mr. Justice Reed's interpretation,
opportunities for doctrinal deviations and factual distinctions are sufficiently
numerous to give the Court wide leeway in determining the status of border-
line practices. The price of this judical freedom is unpredictability. Indeed,
it would be surprising if, in an area as complex as the public school system,
the "wall of separation" were conformed to a mathematical curve rather than
to the vagaries of judicial predilection.43 As Mr. Justice Frankfurter recog-
nized, the McCollum decision "demonstrates anew that the mere formulation
of a relevant Constitutional principle is the beginning of the solution of a
problem, not its answer."4
A NEW AVENUE FOR TAX AVOIDANCE TRANSFERS
THROUGH USE OF THE TRUST DEVICE*
When taxpayers, seeking to avoid tax liability, have relied on a tax-dodge
trust to separate themselves from property which they control, the courts
have refused to be puzzled by the obvious.1 But by a lapse into technical
distinctions in a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
would revive the trust as a device for conveying wealth free of gift and
estate taxes.
same negative assistance. But it is unlikely that any of these entrenched practices will be
challenged, and no such interpretation is necessary to save most borderline "aids" to re-
ligion outside of the public schools. Free lunches and secular textbooks for parochial stu-
dents, like transportation, come within the "child benefit theory" adopted in the Evcrsoll
case (see note 16 supra), as do payments to veterans attending denominational schools;
Chaplains in the Armed Forces can be justified on grounds that the government, having
taken soldiers away from their homes, is obligated to provide opportunities for worship;
"public safety" requires that churches receive assistance such as fire and police protec-
tion.
43. See Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in the McCollun casei mupra note 4
at 478: "It is idle to pretend that ... we can find in the Constitution one word to help
us as judges to decide where the secular ends and the sectarian begins in education. Nor
can we find guidance in any other legal source. It is a matter on which we can find no
law but our prepossessions!'
44. Id. at 466.
* Commissioner v. Hogle, 165 F.2d 352 (C.C.A, 10th 1947).
1. A realistic approach to determination of tax liability where a trust is involved is
one facet of the current overall legislative and judicial policy to frustrate tax avoidanco
regardless of the scheme employed to that end. Thus, whether the taxpayer has used an
assignment, family partnership, or trust device, if he attempts to escape taxation whilo
retaining a beneficial interest in income, courts have disregarded technicalities when con-
vinced that such economic benefit warranted imposition of the tax. Note, 57 YALE L. 3.
308, nn. 1, 2 (1947).
For examples of the realistic attitude displayed in tax decisions involving a trust, see
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In Commissioner v. Hogle,2 the taxpayer and his wife set up two margin
trading accounts in trust for the benefit of their children. The transaction
creating the trust res consisted solely of a bookkeeping entry opening these
margin accounts in the trust name on the books of a brokerage firm owned
by the taxpayer, his wife and children. Although the trusts were irrevocable
and the settlors retained no power to alter the beneficial interests, the tax-
payer dominated the accounts through complete authority to direct the
trading activities.
By successful trading operations, large profits were realized for both trust
accounts. In 1942 the Court of Appeals for theTenth Circuit held the taxpayer,
Hogle, liable for income tax on the trust income from margin trading on the
grounds that these profits were the direct result of his trading skill and were,
in effect, a portion of his personal earnings which he allowed to accrue to the
trust.2 Trust income from the investment of past trading profits in produc-
tive securities was not, to the same extent, controlled by the taxpayer and
therefore was held taxable to the trust, not to the settlor.
Having established Hogle's income tax liability on the net profits of the
margin trading account, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue then deter-
mined that Hogle was liable for gift taxes on the "transfer" of these funds to
Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933) (gift tax); Porter v. Commissioner, 2,8
U.S. 436 (1933) (estate tax); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940) (income tax).
2. Commissioner v. Hogle, 165 F2d 352 (C.CA. 10th 1947), affirinng 7 T. C. 986
(1946). Five judges dissented in the Tax Court decision.
3. Hogle v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 66 (C.CA. 10th 1942).
In general, a settlor of a trust who is not also the cestui can retain various controls
over a trust. These may be classified as follows: (1) control over trust corpus, (2)
control over trust income, and (3) control over the management or administration of the
trust. Fxamples of (1) are a power of revocation, or a short-term trust with reversion
to the settlor. Ex-amples of (2) are power to modify distribution of trust income, or use
of trust income to satisfy the settlor's personal obligations. Fxamples of (3) are power to
vote stock comprising the trust corpus, or power to direct the trust investments.
In Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940), the landmark case in the field, a
settlor of a short-term trust retained administrative powers and authority to control the
distribution of trust income to the beneficiary. The Supreme Court held the settlor liable
for income tax on the trust income under the broad sweep of Iz.-r. REv. Coca § 22(a).
This section defines gross income in general terms without specific reference to trusts.
The Court did not make clear what combination of controls or degree of power retained
was necessary to evoke liability. Numerous subsequent cases have involved application
of the general language of the Clifford decision to situations vhere the controls retained
varied in number and degree. For a collection of such cases, see Pavenstedt, The
Broadened Scope of Section 22(a): The Evolution of the Clifford Doctrine, 51 -rA= L. J.
213, 251-2 (1941).
For the Treasury's attempt to clarify its position as to the combination of circum-
stances which will subject the settlor of a controlled trust to income tax liability, see
T. D. 5488, 1946-1 Cur Bum- 19, as amended by T. D. 5567, 1947 xiT. Rv. Bum. No.
14 at 2 (1947).
The Clifford case has received a great deal of attention from legal commentators. A
number of these articles are collected in Gmasworm, CAsES Anm MAT2 nALS on F zar AL
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the trust. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed a
Tax Court decision denying this contention, offering as a rationale the theory
that the profits were impressed with a trust as they arose, and that accord-
ingly there had been no "transfer" by Hogle upon which the gift tax could
be imposed.
4
But behind the facade of bookeeping entries and the concept of trust
ownership, the taxpayer's children were enriched during the taxable years
to the extent of $356,000. Had no trust been created, Hogle's dealings would
have subjected him not only to income tax as the profits arose but also to
gift tax as they were transferred to the beneficiaries. But it would now seem
that a trust device insufficient to alter income tax liability may still be effec-
tive to negative gift tax liability by preventing the court from finding a
donor, a donee, or a taxable transfer.
6
Such a result clearly controverts the current Supreme Court policy of
frustrating intra-family transactions which tend toward tax avoidance; 7
it conflicts with Congressional intention to make the gift tax applicable both
to direct and indirect transfers of property.8 Finally, in failing to impose tax
TAXATION 457 n.6 (2d ed. 1946) ; see also 2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION
§ 17.17 n.6 (1942) ; ibid. (1946 Supp.).
4. Commissioner v. Hogle, 165 F.2d 352 (C.C.A. 10th 1947).
5. Even having created a trust, Hogle (or his estate) would have incurred liability
for gift or estate taxes if the control which subjected the taxpayer to income tax on the
trust profits had consisted of a potential beneficial interest in the trust or power to modify
distribution of the trust benefits. Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436 (1933); INT.
REv. CODE § 811(c), (d); see cases cited note 13 infra. No good reason suggests a dif-
ferent result when the taxpayer exercises managerial control instead of retaining an-
other type of power if the control retained is sufficient to evoke income tax liability.
6. Although the Hogle decision concerned only the trust device, its reasoning might
also allow the resurrection of the assignment as a tax avoidance scheme. However, both
the Commissioner and the taxpayer apparently assumed that if an assignment were found,
the gift tax would be imposed. And as a practical matter, aside from questions of tax
liability, an assignment would be an inconvenient device under circumstances similar to
those in the instant case.
7. ". . . [W]here the grantor is the trustee and the beneficiaries are members of
his family group, special scrutiny of the arrangement is necessary lest what is in reality
but one economic unit be multiplied into two or more by devices which, though valid under
state law, are not conclusive so far as § 22(a) is concerned." Helvering v. Clifford, 309
U. S. 331, 335 (1940). In the Hogle income tax case, the court made specific reference to
this policy. Hoge v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 66, 71 (C.C.A. 10th 1942).
Since the first Hogle trust was created in 1922 before Congress enacted a gift tax,
the transactions in trust were not originally intended as a device to avoid gift taxation,
8. "The tax shall apply whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise, whether the
gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real or personal, tangible or in-
tangible.... ." Revenue Act of 1932, § 501(b), 47 STAT. 245 (1932). INT. REV. CODE
§ 1000(b) contains identical language.
Revenue Act of 1932, § 501, 47 STAT. 245 (1932), as amended by the Revenue Act of
1934, § 511, 48 STAT. 758 (1934) was applicable to Hogle's margin trading profits for the
years 1936-1939. INT. Rrv. CODE § 1000 was applicable to profits accruing thereafter.
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liability on a device which avoids estate and reduces income taxes the deci-
sion subverts the very purpose of the gift tax statute.0
The court's result can not be justified on the grounds that the Commis-
sioner mistook the proper taxable event in seeking to impose liability as the
margin profits accrued. Conceivably it might be argued that the tax should
be levied at the time the profits are ultimately distributed to Hogle's children.
But this possibility is negated by settled interpretation of the statute mak-
ing a donor liable for gift tax in the year in which he relinquishes actual
dominion and control over the gift.10 Since Hogle's dominion over the trad-
ing income ceased when it was credited to the trust account, tax imposition
should not await distribution of the profits if liability is geared to an aban-
donment of control."1
Nor is the decision warranted by the argument that the tax should have
been levied at the time Hogle created the trust.'2 It might be contended that
this view is required by the line of cases imposing liability upon a settlor at
See SEx. RxP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1932) ; H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. 27-8 (1932).
9. A major purpose of the gift tax was to prevent the escape from estate tax liability
via inter vivos property transfer. A second aim was to supplement the income tax by dis-
couraging transfers which would split among several persons the future income from
donated property. SEN. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1932) ; H. R. Rz. No.
708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27-8 (1932); 2 PAUl, FED nA ESTATE AND GIFT TAxATIvn
§ 15.04 (1942) ; see Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U. S. 176, 479 n.1 (1943).
In the instant case, wealth has escaped death taxes which would burden Hogle's
estate absent existence of the trust. Although the gross estate for death tax purposes, as
defined by Ir. REv. CoDE § 811, includes all property to the extent of the decedent's in-
terest therein, the margin trading profits irrevocably credited to the trust or distributed
to the beneficiaries would not be subject to the estate tax at Hogle's death. Brief for
Petitioner, p. 21, Commissioner v. Hogle, 165 F2d 352 (C.C.A. 10th 1947).
On the other hand, Hogle has successfully removed certain income into lower surtax
brackets, thereby reducing his income tax burden. It is true that Hogle v. Commissioner,
132 F2d 66 (C.C.A. 10th 1942), held the margin trading profits taxable to Hogle person-
ally. But when these profits have been credited to the trust and subsequently invested in
productive property, the income from the investments is taxed to the trust or to the
beneficiaries.
10. The gift tax "... is aimed at transfers of... title that have the quality of a
gift, and a gift is not consummate until put beyond recall." Burnet v. Guggenheim, 28
U. S. 280, 286 (1933). 2 PAuI., op. cit. supra note 9, §§ 17.04-17.07. See cases cited notes
13, 15, 16 infra.
11. Although the court did not specifically consider the question of tax imposition at
the time of distribution of the profits to the beneficiaries, the concept of the trust owning
the profits as they arose would rule out such possibility.
The fact that future trading losses might dissipate the existing profits should not
make the "gift" incomplete before final distribution. The gift tax applies at the time of
cessation of the donor's interest although the donee's rights may not have been fixed.
Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U. S. 184 (1943); Higgins v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 237
(C.C.A. 1st 1942) ; Hernstadt v. Hoey, 47 F. Supp. 874 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
12. If this argument were valid, the Commissioner and not the court would be at
fault in permitting the present avoidance.
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the time he relinquishes power to revoke and modify-the trust 1 since logic
released this power at the outset. But these cases can be distinguished on
two grounds. They did not involve a retention of managerial control by the
settlors after the other powers were relinquished. Moreover, whereas the
settlors there transferred existing productive property, Hogle conveyed only
an expectancy in profits to arise in the future. This latter distinction seems
especially pertinent in view of the inherent impossibility of valuing the Hogle
trust for gift tax purposes at the time of its inception. Such valuation was
dependent upon the volume and success of future trading; and the taxpayer
had discretion to trade as little or as much as he pleased. 14
Considering the practical and doctrinal obstacles to gift tax imposition
either at the trust's inception or at distribution of the trust benefits, the
court could frustrate the Hogle tax avoidance device only by finding liability
13. Tax imposed when settlor relinquished Power: Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner,
308 U.S. 39 (1939) ; Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933) ; Fletcher Trust Co.
v. Commissioner, 141 F2d 36 (C.C.A. 7th 1944) ; Blumberg v. Smith, 138 F.2d 956 (C.C.A.
7th 1943); Commissioner v. Prouty, 115 F2d 331 (C.C.A. 1st 1940) ; Means v. United
States, 39 F.2d 748 (Ct. Cl. 1930); ef. Goodman v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 218
(C.C.A. 2d 1946); Higgins v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 237 (C.C.A. 1st 1942); Com-
missioner v. Solomon, 124 F2d 86 (C.C.A. 3d 1941); Herzog v. Commissioner, 116
F.2d 591 (C.C.A. 2d 1941); Commissioner v. Allen, 108 F2d 961 (C.C.A. 3d 1939);
Hernstadt v. Hoey, 47 F. Supp. 874 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
Tax not imposed because settlor still retained power: Rasquin v. Humphreys, 308
U.S. 54 (1939); Hesslein v. Hoey, 91 F2d 954 (C.C.A. 2d 1937), cert. denied 302
U.S. 756 (1937) ; Cockrell v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 148 (Ct. Cl. 1941) ; Harriet W.
Rosenau, 37 B. T. A. 468 (1938) ; cf. Elizabeth S. Hettler, 5 T. C. 1079 (1945) ; Mar-
guerite F. Schwarzenbach, 4 T. C. 179 (1944).
Since the donee may be personally liable if the donor fails to pay the gift tax, INT.
REv. COD. § 1009; Revenue Act of 1932, § 510,47 STAT. 249 (1932), it would be unfair to
impose the tax so long as the donor may alter the donees receipt of the gift. However, in
Hernstadt v. Hoey, 47 F. Supp. 874 (S. D. N. Y. 1942), the tax was imposed although the
beneficiaries' interests remained uncertain due to retention of broad powers by the donor's
attorney. And in Higgins v. Commissioner, 129 F2d 237 (C.C.A. 1st 1942), the tax
was imposed although a trustee retained power to modify trust benefits after the settlor
relinquished control.
The provision in the Revenue Act of 1932, § 501(c), 47 STAr. 245 (1932), expressly
making the tax inapplicable if the donor retained power to revoke the trust (either alone
or in conjunction with anyone not having an adverse interest in the disposition of the
property) was repealed by the Revenue Act of 1934, § 511, 48 STAr. 758 (1934), since
Burnet v. Guggenheim, supra at 283, held the section to be only declaratory of existing
law. SEra. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1934) ; H. R. RP. No. 704, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 40 (1934). Treasury Regulations now contain provisions similar to those in the
repealed section. U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, § 501, Art. 3 (1936).
14. In Commissioner v. Marshall, 125 F.2d 943 (C.C.A. 2d 1942), the taxpayer
argued that certain contingent remainders were not subject to gift tax at that time be-
cause accurate valuation was difficult. In denying this contention, the court said: "Much
could be said for such a contention, if the donor . . .had reserved . . .power ... so
that the actual enjoyment or non-enjoyment of the remainders depended on the donor's




as the profits accrued. Several rationales were available which could have
supported such a result. The dominion and control doctrine itself supports
tax liability at this time. Where income is distributed to a cestui or is irrev-
ocably accumulated for his benefit before the settlor has relinquished control
over the balance of a trust, the gift tax is imposed on that part of the income
at the time of such distribution 25 or accumulation."' In the instant case,
Hogle remained free to control the results of margin trading until the trans-
action had been consummated.1 7 Logically, therefore, under the cessation
of control concept he should incur gift tax liability on the profits of any given
transaction in the year in which it was completed.18
Orthodox trust doctrine supplies another line of approach supporting as-
sessment of gift taxes at the time the profits accrued. Since a transfer or
declaration in trust is incomplete until the trust res comes into existence,'
0
if the couit had held the margin profits to be trust res rather than trust in-
come, the gift tax would have been imposed as the profits arose. A similar
15. Steckel v. Commissioner, 154 F2d 4 (C.C.A. 6th 1946); lWzlliam Fleming, 3
T. C. 974 (1944) ; Chas. F. Roeser, 2 T. C. 293 (1943) ; Leonard A. Yerkes, 47 B. T. A.
431 (1942); Frieda Schiff Warburg, P-H 1947 TC MuE. Dc. Snv. ff 47,193 (1947);
Antoinette K. Brown, P-H 1944 TC YEU. DEm. SEarv. f 44,044 (1944) ; Edward S. Moore,
P-H 1942 BTA A.ND TC Msz. Dc. SEmv. 42,451 (1942); ef. Commissioner v. Warner,
127 F.2d 913 (C.C.A. 9th 1942). See Evelyn N. Moore, 1 T. C. 14, 16 (1942). See
T. D. 5010, 1940-2 Cums BuLL. 293. Carlton B. Overton, 6 T. C. 304 (1946), aff'd 162
F.2d 155 (C.C.A. 2d 1947), applied the same principles although no trust was involved.
16. Richardson v. Commissioner, 151 F2d 102 (C.C. 2d 1945), ccrt. denicd 326
U.S. 796 (1946).
17. The e-act degree of control retained by the taxpayer can not be determined. For
example, whether Hogle could shunt profits betveen his personal account and the trust
account after a trading transaction had been consumated is not clear. However, in situ-
ations such as this where a taxpayer is currently trading for more than one account it
would be difficult to make sure that a given transaction from the outset was irrevocably
earmarked for a particular account. This is especially true where the trader, as in this
case, also controls the brokerage firm through which the purchases and sales are made,
since even "irrevocable" credits to one account can be switched to another by bookkeeping
entry.
18. In the event that Hogle could determine whether profits were to be credited to
the trust account or to his personal account after a given transaction was completed, the
dominion and control test would lead to tax liability at the time an irrevocable entry was
made on the books. See note 17 supra.
Even accepting the artificial concept of trust ownership of profits as they accrue, it
may then be argued that the trust has received from Hogle a gift of valuable services upon
dich the tax should be levied. Since the value of these services can best be measured by
the profits which they produced, the tax liability on such a gift of services would approxi-
mate the liability on a gift of the profits. However, some difference in the tax base re-
sults if the gift were considered to be one of services rather than profits. The measure-
ment of the gift of services would be the profits, less interest on the trust corpus used.
In such an evaluation technique, it would appear advisable to levy the tax in the year in
which the profits accrued rather than in the year the services were rendered.
19. 1 BoGmT, Tausrs Aw TRus=ES § 112 (1935) ; 1 Scorr, Tnusvs §§ 26, S6, E62
(1939).
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rationale has been employed to defeat income tax avoidance where, as here,
a taxpayer created a trust solely of profits to arise in the future6.2
Finally, the reasoning of the Hogle income tax case would readily support
gift tax liability in the present litigation. In the earlier case, the court realis-
tically viewed the trust device as amounting, in substance, to an assignment
of the taxpayer's personal trading profits. 2 Presumably, for gift tax purposes
also, an assignment of income in each year of profitable trading could be
found.
22
The most satisfactory solution to tax avoidance problems created by use
of the trust device must await Congressional action to integrate the income,
estate, and gift taxes. 23 In many situations the tax statutes themselves com-
pel anomalous results.2 4 But while the gift tax is not so closely coordinated
20. Brainard v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 880 (C.C.A. 7th 1937), cert. granted 302
U.S. 682 (1938), dismissed 303 U.S. 665 (1938) ; Note, 36 Mice. L. Rav. 1041 (1938).
A promise to make annual transfers in trust, even if binding, is subject to gift tax
only as each transfer is made. John D. Archbold, 42 B. T. A. 453 (1940).
21. "[Trading for the trust] amounted in each of those years to a voluntary assign-
ment of a portion of ... [Hogle's] personal earnings." Hogle v. Commissioner, 132
F.2d 66, 71 (C.C.A. 10th 1942).
22. For discussion of the application of the gift tax to assignments of income, see 2
PAUL, op. cit. supra note 9, § 16.12.
23. "[W]ithout further aid from Congress it is perhaps impossible for the courts to
work out a complete integration of the three taxes." Higgins v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d
237, 239 (C.C.A. 1st 1942). For the courts' difficulties in attempting to integrate the gift,
estate, and income taxes as they now stand, see 2 PAUL, op. dt. supra note 9, § 17.03.
Commentators have been prolific in proposing various methods of coordinating or in-
tegrating the three levies. See generally, ADvISORY CoMrITrE TO THlE T ASURY DE-
PARTMENT, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAxEs, A PROPOSAL FOR INTEGRATION AND FOR
CoaLArTION wrrH TE INcomE TAX (1947); Polisher, Recent Developments in Federal
Gift Tax, 50 Decic. L. Rav. 49, 68-71 (1946) ; Griswold, A Plan For The Coordination of
the Income, Estate, and Gift Tax Provisions With Respect to Trusts and Other Transfers,
56 HARv. L. Rv. 337 (1942)'; Warren, Correlation of Gift and Estate Taxes, 55 HARV.
L. REv. 1 (1941) ; Greenfield, Correlation of Federal Income, Estate and Gift Taxes, 16
TEMP. L. Q. 194 (1942). The suggestions range from complete integration into one
comprehensive income tax, SIMoNs, PERsoNAL. Ico ME TAXATION 205-20 (1938), through
integration of the estate and gift taxes into one cumulative transfer levy, ADvMsoR Coms-
METTEr To TEE TREASURY, op. cit. supra; Altman, Combining the Gift and Estate Taxes,
16 TAx MAG. 259 (1938), to a proposal that the Federal government relinquish the es-
tate and gift taxes to the states, CoMMITrEE oN POSTWAR TAx Pocy, A TAX PROGRAM
FOR A SOLVENT AmaIcA 165-6 (1945).
24. For example, a transferor may absolve himself from the income tax on trust in-
come yet remain liable for an estate tax on the trust property. Conversely, he may remain
subject to the income tax but escape liability for estate taxes. Compare INT. REV. CODE
§ 166 zwith § 811(d). Or he may pay a gift tax on the transfer in trust, INT. Ray. CODE
§1000 yet remain subject to the income tax on trust income, INT. REv. CODE § 22(a) ;
T. D. 5488, 1946-1 Cum. BtU. 19, as amended by T. D. 5567, 1947 INT. RaV. BULL, No,
14 at 2 (1947) ; and perhaps find the value of the trust property included in his estate for
Federal death tax purposes. INT. REv. CODE § 810(c). See ADvisoRY COMMITTEE TO THE
TREAsURY, op. cit. supra note 23, at 7-13.
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with the income tax as to be imposed on every occasion where income taxed
to a donor is paid to a donee 25 the court should not hesitate to achieve a
consistent result where it is not expressly precluded by statute or higher
judicial authority. Since the court could have easily found support for coor-
dinating the gift and income taxes on these transactions, :  it is particularly
regrettable that it should have chosen instead to invite tax avoidance trans-
fers.
SAFETY AND OVERTIME PAY:
THE MOTOR CARRIER EXEMPTION FROM THE FLSA*
WHmE some half-million members of the interstate trucking industry en-
joy other benefits of the Fair Labor Standards Act,' employees subject to
Interstate Commerce Commission regulation under the Motor Carrier Act
are exempted from the Hours provision.2 The exemption denies such em-
25. Where income of a controlled trust is taxed to the settlor, the Treasury in many
instances prefers to levy the gift tax at the time of the trust's creation instead of impos-
ing separate taxes as income is paid to the beneficiaries. One initial tax on the cestui's
total interest is ordinarily productive of greater revenue. 2 PAUL, op. cit. sspra note 9,
§ 17.17. But in the instant case, gift tax imposition was impossible at the creation of the
trust. Seep. 1126 supra.
26. Although the court gave no reasons which required an abandonment of the prac-
tical approach employed in the Hogie income tax case, it might have been influenced by
the Tax Court's opinion that the gift tax did not have as broad a scope as § 22(a) of
the income tax statute. James A. Hogle, 7 T. C. 986, 99D (1946). This position seems
untenable in view of the expressed intention of Congress and the language of the gift tax
statute. See notes 8, 9 supra.
* Morris v. McComb, 68 Sup. Ct 131 (1947).
1. 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 201 ct seq. (1940). Exemptions from the
FLSA have generally been narrowly construed. Sce Phillips v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490
(1945), and cases collected in 1 P-H WAGE AND HoUR 1110, 702.1.
2. The Hours provision, § 7(a) of the FLSA, provides that employees "engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" shall receive additional compensa-
tion for hours worked over forty per week of at least "one and one half times the regu-
lar rate... ." 52-STAT. 1063 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 207 (a) (1940).
§ 13 (b) (1) makes the Hours provision inapplicable to "any employee with respect
to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to establish qualifications and
maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act,
1935; . . ." 52 STAT. 1068 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 213(b) (1) (1940).
By § 204 of the Motor Carrier Act, the ICC is required to regulate common and
contract carriers with respect to "qualifications and maximum hours of service of em-
ployees, and safety of operation and equipment" § 204(a) (1) and (2). And by § 204(a)
(3) : "To establish for private carriers of property by motor vehicle, if need therefor is
found, reasonable requirements to promote safety of operation, and to that end prescribe
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ployees statutory overtime benefits, since the ICC has no equivalent author-
ity to set increased overtime wages. Categorical definition of the scope of
the FLSA exemption in terms of ICC jurisdiction has stimulated judicial
confusion and conflict between the agencies charged with administering the
two acts.3
Attributing the motor carrier exemption to the promotion of highway
safety, the Supreme Court in 1940 limited the scope of ICC jurisdiction to
employees whose activities "affected safety of operation." 4 Conflicting de-
terminations of what activities affect safety and what quantum of such ac-
tivities is required for exemption were made by the ICC and the Wage-Hour
Division. The former announced that four classes of employees-drivers,
drivers' helpers, mechanics and loaders-devoted a "large" or "substantial
part" of their time to activities affecting safety of operations and thus were
within its jurisdiction. 5 The Wage-Hour Division, on the other hand, sub-
qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees, and standards of equipment."
49 STAT. 546 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §304(a) (1) (2) (3) (1940).
3. See Beardsley, The Conflict Between Administrative Agencies With Regard to
Employees of Interstate Motor Carriers Whose Duties Affect Safety of Operation, 13
I.C.C. PRAcr. J. 510 (1946).
4. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940). The Supreme
Court reversed a decree ordering the ICC to assert jurisdiction over all employees of motor
carriers. Justice Reed's careful review of the legislative history of § 204 of the Motor
Carrier Act and his conclusion that Congress did not intend to give the Commission
"broad and unusual powers over all employees" seem to have ended further controversy
over the matter. Id. at 546-9. The Court's position was substantiated by previous hold-
ings to the same effect by both the ICC and the Wage-Hour Division. Ex Part, No.
MC-2, 3 M.C.C. 665, 667 (1937) ; Ex Parte No. MC-28, 13 M.C.C. 481, 488-9 (1939) i
Interpretative Bulletin No. 9, 1940 WH Man. 168, 169.
In contrast to the limitation of the motor carrier exemption to safety workers, all
employees of rail carriers are exempted from the overtime provisions of the Wage-Hour
Act because exemption is determined solely by the status of the employer rather than by
that of each employee. § 13(b) (2), 52 STAT. 1068 (1938), 29 U.S.C. §213 (b) (2) (1940).
The ICC did not subject drivers of private interstate motor carriers to regulation
until a year and a half after the Wage-Hour Act took effect, Ex Parte No. MC-3, 23
M.C.C. 1 (1940). Following the American Trucking case, the Wage-Hour Administrator
raised the issue of whether an employee whose work admittedly affected safety was to be
denied overtime benefits if the ICC had not as yet exercised its power to regulate his
hours or qualifications. See Interpretative Bulletin No. 9, 1941 WH Man. 294-5. In
Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 U.S. 44 (1943), the Court specifically rejected the
Administrator's position that exercise of power by the ICC was a condition precedent to
exemption and held that existence of the power to regulate, without the exercise thereof,
brought employees within ICC jurisdiction and thus within the exemption. Consequently
many employees found themselves in a "no man's land" between the Wage-Hour Act
and the Motor Carrier Act, exempt from the one and not regulated under the other. The
Wage-Hour Administrator estimated that in an industry in which there are roughly
600,000 employees, 50,000 helpers, mechanics and loaders were in this "no man's land".
Address before the Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the Pennsylvania Motor Truck Ass'n,
June 7, 1946, reprinted in 1947 WH Man. 131, 136.
5. In response to a petiiion by the American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. following the
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divided the activities of the four classes of employees into those which in its
opinion affected safety and those which did not, and established certain per-
centage tests for the amount of "safety" work requisite to ICC jurisdiction.0
decision in the Anericazn Trcking Ass'ens case, note 4 supra, the Commission determined
which employees, other than drivers, were subject to ICC jurisdiction. x Parte No.
MC-2, 28 M.C.C. 125 (1941). Pointing to such activities as repairing lights and brahes,
the ICC concluded that all mechanics devoted a 'large portion of their time" to activities
affecting interstate highway safety. Id. at 132-3. But at the same time the Commission
acknowledged that "less than I percent and probably less than one-half of 1 percent of
the highway accidents, in which carriers subject to the act are involved, are caused by
poor work done by mechanics employed by such carriers." Id. at 132-. No attempt was
made to evaluate the various aspects of mechanical work in terms of their effect upon
safety, though the Commission did concede that an employee whose sole duties con-
sisted of oiling, gassing, greasing or vashing vehicles or one who did only painting, car-
pentry work or tarpaulin tailoring would not be considered within ICC jurisdiction. Id.
at 133.
While admitting that "poor loading is the cause of relatively few highway accidents,"
id. at 134, the Commission found that loaders devote a "large part of their time to ac-
tivities which directly affect" interstate highway safety. The activities of loading and un-
loading were treated alike as regards the effect on highway safety. Id. at 134.
Drivers' helpers were found to devote a "substantial part" of their time to safety
activities because they flagged the driver across rail-crossings and assisted him in turn-
ing around on busy highways. Also, the helper performed the important function of
setting out flares in the event of breakdown and often stayed with the disabled truck while
the driver sought help. For good measure armed guards on armored trucks were included,
and even 25 young ladies who acted as conductorettes on busses operating out of Seattle
were deprived of their statutory overtime benefits because in the event of accident they
could help the driver procure aid and protect the vehicle from on-coming traffc. Id. at
135-6. These classifications are of crucial importance in light of their incorporation by
the Levinson decision, note 8 infra.
Comprehensive safety regulations, including maximum hours of service and qualifica-
tions of drivers, were adopted by the ICC as early as 1937. Ex Parte No. MC-2, 3
M.C.C. 665 (1937). But the Commission has, as yet, found no need for establishing regu-
lations for mechanics, loaders, and helpers.
6. Despite the assumption of jurisdiction by the ICC, note 5 siupra, the Wage-Hour
Administrator in Interpretative Bulletin No. 9 continued to set forth standards of exemp-
tion which conflicted with those set by the ICC. Initially the Administrator regarded as
exempt only drivers of vehicles operating within interstate commerce. 1940 WH Man.
168, 169. And even they were not exempt in any week in which they devoted over 20%
of their time to non-safety work. 1942 WVH Man. 377, 379. According to the Adminis-
trator, non-safety work included such activities as unloading trucks and loading baggage
on busses. Id. at 378. Subsequent to the ICC's decision in 28 M.C.C. 125, note 5 supra,
the Administrator revised his standards to include mechanics, loaders and helpers as
safety workers and lowered his percentage figure from Z0% exempt activities to 50%.
1944 WH Man. 520, 523. This latter standard conflicted directly with regulation by the
ICC of partial-duty drivers of private carriers; see Ex Parte No. MC-3, 23 M.C.C. 1,
31 (1940). As an example of classification by the Administrator, a loader who spent
51% of his time unloading in any one week was not considered exempt under § 13(b) (1)
of the FLSA for that week whereas the ICC male no distinction betveen loading and un-
loading. See Beardsley, Wage-Hour La z--Status of Motor Carrier Employees, 14
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Faced with these conflicting interpretations,' the Supreme Court it! Levin-
son v. Spector Motor Service 8 elaborated a formula of exemption which largely
incorporated the administrative determinations of the ICC and specifically
rejected those of the Wage-Hour Division.' An employee was to be exempt
if his duties "as a whole or in substantial part" placed him within one of the
classifications of safety workers established by the ICC, 1° and in this alloca-
tion the character of the work was the important factor, not the amount or
percentage of time spent. x Basic to the Levinson decision was the Court's
premise that Congress in enacting the exemption had intentionally rendered
the FLSA and the Motor Carrier Act mutually exclusive in order to extend,
as far as possible, the ICC's highway safety program.
1 2
In the recent case of Morris v. McComb,1" which preserves intact the Levin-
son test as to the amount and type of safety work, the Court concerned itself
with the quantum of interstate activity necessary for exemption. In the
Morris case, the employees were in other respects within the Levinson test,14
but were engaged in interstate commerce only during a minority of their
time. Two of them engaged in no interstate activities whatsoever, and of
the total services rendered by their employer less than four percent were
I.C.C. PaAcr. J. 615, 616-7 (1947). For a description of the Administrator's approach in
applying his 50% test, see 1947 WH Man. 131, 133-5.
7. For discussion of the confusion among the lower courts in regard to the exemp-
tion, see Josselson, Some Aspects of the Motor Carrier Exemption under the Wage
Hour Law, 7 U. OF DEaTOlr L.J. 1, 4 et seq. (1943).
8. 330 U.S. 649 (1947). See also Walling v. Comet Carriers, 151 F.2d 107 (C.C.A.
2d 1945), cert. granted, 326 U.S. 716 (1946), dismissed on motion of counsel, 328 U.S.
819 (1946) ; and Pyramid Motor Freight v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695 (1947) (remanded for
decision in accordance with the principles stated in the Levinson case.)
In Boutell v. Walling, 327 U.S. 463 (1946), it was held that the exemption applies
only to employees of carriers and that employees of a separately incorporated garage
owned and operated by a carrier and servicing the carrier's trucks were not exempt. See
20 Tmaa. L.Q. 483 (1947).
9. 330 U.S. 649, 676-7 (1947). Note rejection of the 50% test set by the Wage-
Hour Administrator. Id. at 683-4.
10. See Pyramid Motor Freight v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695, 707 (1947). The Court
specifically reserved decision as to power of the ICC to regulate employees, less than a
substantial part of whose activities came within the ICC's safety classifications. Id. at
707-8. This reservation suggests that the Court might go so far as to exempt an em-
ployee who devoted any work at all to safety activities, as defined by the Commission.
11. Levinson v. Spector Motor Co., 330 U.S. 649, 674-5 (1947). For recent cases
misapplying the Levinson test, see McDuffie v. Hayes Freight Lines, 71 F.Supp 755
(E.D.Ill. 1947) (court reverts to analyzing the work of various mechanics to see if safety
is affected); Reynolds v. Rogers Cartage Co., 71 F.Supp. 870, 875 (W.D.Ky. 1947) (test
of exemption is whether the employee does any work substantially affecting safety of
operation or equipment on the highways).
12. Levinson v. Spector Motor Co., supra note 11 at 661-2.
13. 68 Sup. Ct. 131 (1947).
14. Id. at 135. The Court limited its holding to full-time drivers and mechanics,
employees who satisfy the Lezinson test as to the amount and type of safety work.
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interstate in character.'- In holding that the "entire classification of the
petitioner's drivers and 'mechanics' "was within ICC jurisdiction, the Court
lumped together for purposes of exemption employees whose participation
in interstate commerce ranged from ninety-seven interstate trips a year to
none."6 Membership in a group, which as a whole engages in a small amount
of interstate activity, is now sufficient to bring an employee within the motor
carrier exemption.
Three dissenting justices strongly attacked the majority's evaluation of
Congressional intent and the Court's consequent uncompromising extension
of the safety program at the expense of overtime coverage. By their view
employees should not be deprived of the paternalistic benefits of the FLSA
because of minute and sporadic amounts of work done within ICC jurisdic-
tion. 7 A fourth justice dissented independently, finding the decision an ex-
treme extension of the Leoinson case.'
Whether it be argued that the Congressional intent 11 in exempting motor
carrier employees from the coverage of FLSA lay in a desire to avoid ad-
15. Id. at 133, 136. During the calendar year immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint 43 drivers worked a total of 1903 weeks, 1433 or 75.6% of which were exclu-
sively devoted to inter-plant (intra-state) activity. Transcript of Record, p. 27, Morris
v. McComb supra note 13. During 319 of these weeks the driver made only one interstate
trip, and in 85 weeks only two such trips were made. Brief for Administrator, p. 6, Morris
v. McComb, supra.
16. 68 Sup. Ct. 131, 136 (1947).
17. Id. at 133-9 (1947). Justices Black and Douglas concurred in Justice Murphy's
dissent. Justice Black, as a senator, was co-sponsor of the FLSA and explained the ex-
emption provision in question on the Senate floor. 81 Co.xo. REC. 7875 (1937).
18. 68 Sup. Ct 131, 140. Justice Rutledge, acknowledging that the Lcvinson case
foreshadowed any situation where an employee's work substantially affected interstate
safety, found no support in that decision for the instant result.
19. The exemption occasioned only brief debate in the Senate, 81 Couo. REc. 7875
(1937), and none in the House. Senator Black said that "... . it was the policy of the
committee, in cases where regulation of hours and wages are given to other governmental
agencies, to write the bill in such a way as not to conflict with such regulation.... [The
exemption] would apply the same principle to truck drivcrs insofar as hours of labor are
concerned. It is my understanding that the hours have been regulated by the Interstate
Commerce Commission rcently. ... The committee were of the opinion... that it was
exceedingly important that the long hours of truck dricrs should be regulated in the in-
terest of public safety." (Italics added) Ibid. The only discussion concerning the effect
of the exemption upon wages was occasioned by Senator Shipstead's inquiry whether the
exemption meant that the ICC would now have the power to fi: both the wages and hours of
truck drivers. In response, Senator Black emphasized that truck drivers would still be
governed by the minimum wage provision of the Act and would be exempt only from the
maximum hours provision. Ibid. No mention was made of the fact that exemption from the
hours provision necessarily excluded employees from statutory overtime benefits.
While Congress expressed an intent to exempt truck drivers, it put no similar intent
on record in regard to mechanics, loaders or helpers. The effect of the work of these
last categories of employees upon safety was not emphasized until four years later. See
note 5 supra. It is theoretically possible now under the Lcvinson test to exempt a mechanic
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ministrative conflict or to promote highway safety, no logical justification
would seem to support the statutory exemption. There is no inconsistency
whatever between limiting hours in the interests of highway safety and
paying extra wages in cases where the overtime has actually been worked; 20
and by the same token, there is little likelihood of administrative crossfire
where one agency is empowered solely to establish regulations over hours,
and the other can only enforce a time and a half wage rate for overtime hours.
It was perhaps with this in mind that the Court had shaved down the broad
literal exemption by excluding from FLSA only those workers concerned
with safety.
But this half-way measure of restricting the scope of the exemption merely
aggravated the administrative snarl which Congress had invited when in an
attempt to avoid administrative confusion it had defined the jurisdiction of
one agency in terms of that of arrother. Short of judicial repeal of the ill-
considered exemption, the Court could only attempt to strike a balance be-
tween administrative convenience and the statutory benefits extended by
the FLSA. Its choice was to ameliorate administrative complexity by adopt-
ing the ICC's broad interpretation of the exemption.
The Court's decision must be evaluated in terms of its actual impact upon
the wage position of the employees affected. If they are adequately protected
by collective bargaining agreements so that loss of statutory overtime does
not place them in an unequal wage position, the Court's solution may be
justified as a palliative to the unfortunate administrative tangle created by
the statutory exemption. But if, in extending the exemption to embrace all
motor carrier employees remotely associated with safety in interstate com-
merce, the Court has effectively prejudiced their wage position, it may well
be censured even though its decision may have made a minor contribution
to administrative efficiency; particularly so, if, as it is plausible to argue,
Congress intended to exempt only interstate truck drivers.21
In any event, Congress would do well to reexamine 22 the questionable
who spends 9517 of his time greasing trucks and 59o repairing radiators because such an
employee is within the ICC's definition of a mechanic and because he is not solely en-
gaged in greasing. Ibid. Of course, collective bargaining agreements may insure that
such a worker is exclusively employed in greasing and thus protect his overtime benefits,
20. The Court itself acknowledged this in Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330
U.S. 649, 661 (1947).
21. See note 19 supra.
22. In 1945, the Wage-Hour Administrator recommended an amendment to § 13(b)
(1), which would have narrowed the exemption to motor carrier employees for whom
the ICC had actually issued regulations. The proposal was passed by the Senate but
pigeon-holed by the House Labor Committee. For discussion of the history of this bill,
see Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649, 684 n. 27 (1947). Representatives
of the American Trucking Ass'ns testified on the proposed measure, suggesting amend-
ments which would have vitiated its adverse economic effect upon the trucking companies.
For example, they urged that the "original intent" of Congress be restored by provIdIng
that payment of one and one-half times the minimum wage would satisfy the requirement
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considerations which were thought to require the blanket exemption, for its
results have been an administrative quagmire and possible deprivation of
substantive rights.
DETERMINATION OF THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION FOR
ERRONEOUS IMPRISONMENT UNDER THE FEDERAL LAW*
TEN minutes in a locked room grounds an action for false imprisonment;
ten years in the penitentiary does not. European civil codes have long al-
lowed compensation to the innocent mistakenly punished by the state,' but
only recently have remedies based on a qualified waiver of sovereign immun-
ity been devised in the United States to redress the most serious form of
false imprisonment-the execution of erroneous judicial sentence. The stat-
utes of California,2 New York,3 North Dakota 4 and Wisconsin 5 require
proceedings before an administrative board or commission; the federal act,"
in cases where the error is not corrected by executive pardon, prescribes
judicial proceedings. Under neither the state nor federal statutes is compen-
sation automatic on reversal of the criminal conviction, but will be granted
only if the claimant is proven "innocent." The definition of innocence varies
for overtime. This provision would have legislatively overruled Overnight v. Missel, 316
U.S. 572 (1942), where the requirement of one and one-half times the employee's rate
was established. See Beardsley, Wagc-Hour Law-Stats of Motor Carrier Employces,
14 I.C.C. PRAcr. 3. 615, 621 (1947).
*United States v. Keegan, 71 F. Supp. 623 (S.D. N.Y. 1947).
1. European countries have allowed compensation for improper imprisonment for
many years. The remedies vary from judicial to administrative, from highly restrictive
to automatic on reversal of the conviction. Some (including Austria, Germany, Normay,
Sweden and Denmark) not only compensate for imprisonment following erroneous con-
viction, but also for detention before trial if the claimant is found not guilty, and for
detention followed by release without trial. For a detailed analysis of the European
provisions, see BORCHAm, CoNVcrIG THE IxmocNr 375 et seq. (1932).
2. Cal. Stat. 1913, c.165, p245; CAT PEN. CoDE §§ 4900-4906 (Dcering, 1940).
3. N. Y. Laws 1946, c.10, p.15.
4. N. D. Laws 1917, c.172, p.237; N. D. REV. CODE, tit.12, c.57, p.S23 (1943).
5. Wis. Laws 1913, c.189, p.197; WVis. STAT. § 285.05, p.2949 (1945).
6. 52 STAT. 438 (1938); 18 U.S.C. §§ 729-32 (1940). This statute vas drafted by
Edwin M. Borchard, then Law Librarian of Congress, now Professor of Law, Yale Law
School, and first introduced in 1913. As finally passed, the statute differs widely from
the Borchard Bill, which generally followed the acts of California and Wisconsin. The
original law specifically placed the burden of proof on petitioner, provided for determina-
tion of innocence in the Court of Claims rather than the trial courts, and required the
Attorney General to contest by all legal means. Instead of placing a $5,00D limit and
comprehending all damages, it allowed recovery for tectudary loss only.
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with the jurisdiction, but the requirements of the federal act are the most
stringent, and present the greatest difficulties in interpretation.
The federal statute provides that any person who has served all or part of
a sentence imposed by a federal court and is then found not guilty on appeal,
rehearing, or a new trial, or is pardoned on the ground of innocence, may sue
the United States in the Court of Claims for compensation up to $5,000. The
only evidence admissible on the issue of innocence is either a pardon, or a
certificate of innocence issued by the court in which the accused was adjudged
not guilty. The certificate or pardon must contain the following recitals or
findings:
a. Petitioner did not commit any of the acts charged; or,
b. his conduct in connection with such charge did not constitute a
crime or offense against the United States or the state of local juris-
diction; and
c. he has not, either intentionally or by wilful misconduct, or negli-
gence, contributed to bring about his arrest or conviction.7
Although this statute has been in effect for nine years, only recently was
the first request for a certificate of innocence considered s in United States v.
KeeganY Keegan was a member of, and legal counsel for, the German-Ameri-
can Bund. ' After passage of the Selective Service Act, Keegan and other
officers of the Bund, collectively by publication of a Bund Command and
individually by advice to members, exhorted the group to resist the Act and
refuse to do military duty. Keegan was indicted for conspiring to counsel
evasion of the Selective Service Act, convicted, and sentenced by a federal
district court to five years' imprisonment. The conviction was unanimously
affirmed by the circuit court."0 The Supreme Court reversed 11 on the ground
that the evidence was insufficient to establish the conspiracy, four justices
dissenting and -two concurring separately. Keegan's victory was somewhat
Pyrrhic, for he had served three years in jail. Seeking compensation for his
erroneous conviction, he filed a petition for a certificate of innocence, which
was referred to the trial judge who had presided in the criminal proceedings.
The Government contested, and the certificate was denied on the grounds
7. The pertinent provisions of the Act are here paraphrased rather than quoted sn
extenso. Omitted are § 731, providing that a claimant must have exhausted all recourse
to the courts before receiving the pardon relied on, and § 732, allowing a proceeding in
fornia paupers.
8. Five unsuccessful actions have been brought in the Court of Claims; two based on
pardons and three, two by the same plaintiff, based on a writ of habeas corpus. In none
was the statute construed in detail and, as the court in the principal case points out, in two
the Court of Claims misread the statutory language. Prisament v. United States, 92 Ct. Cl.
434 (1941) ; Viles v. United States, 95 Ct. Cl. 591 (1942) ; Hadley v. United States, 101
Ct. Cf. 112 (1944) (habeas corpus, and statute misread); Hadley v. United States, 106 Ct.
Cl. 819 (1946) (habeas corpus, and statute misread); Ekberg v. United States, 76 F.
Supp. 99 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
9. 71 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
10. United States v. Keegan, 141 F.2d 248 (C.C.A. 2d 1944).
11. Keegan v. United States, 325 U. S. 478 (1945).
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that (1) Keegan was ineligible under the first statutory subsection because he
had in fact committed the acts charged, (2) he was barred by the second
subsection because counselling evasion constituted a crime against the United
States, and (3) his arrest was brought about by his wilful misconduct in
promulgating the Bund Command and by his evasive and perjurious testi-
mony before the grand jury, both grounds for denial under the third sub-
section. In its exhaustive opinion the district court decided, explicitly or
implicitly, most of the issues fundamental to any petition for such judicial
certificate.
Preliminary to the examination of this case, the court considered whether
the language of the statute, in providing that the certificate must contain
recitals a "or" b "and" c, meant a or (b + c) as opposed to c + (a or b). 2 Its
conclusion, which must be considered dicta since Keegan was found inelig-
ible under all three, was that a standing alone would provide sufficient basis
for the issuance of a certificate, without reference to negligence or miscon-
duct. But this is a statute waiving sovereign immunity, and the court's
interpretation is the less strict of the two.'3 In addition, if the court is cor-
rect it is difficult to see why the statute was not simplified by combining b
and c into one subsection. It would thus seem unlikely that this interpreta-
tion will be followed; the requirement of "clean hands" may well be applied
uniformly to all claimants, whether they are victims of mistaken identity,
or convicted through errors of law.
The court was met at the outset with the problem of whether this was an
adversary or ex parte proceeding. The right of the Government to contest
was not discussed, but from the court's acceptance of the briefs and argument
of the United States it must be inferred that this was considered an adversary
proceeding. Since the certificate is conclusive evidence in the Court of Claims
of all issues except the measure of damages, in the absence of specific langu-
age to the contrary the Government clearly has sufficient interest to inter-
vene, even though it may not be a necessary party.' 4
The court rejected petitioner's contention that the duty to issue the certif-
icate was purely ministerial on proof of acquittal. It was convinced that
its function here was discretionary, and in the light of the legislative history 15
12. The interrelation of the recitals was partially and summarily treated in Pria-
ment v. United States, 92 Ct. Cl. 434 (1941). The Court of Claims there denied com-
pensation on a pardon because it failed to contain recitals under both b and c of the Act.
Prisament evidently being a victim of mistaken identity, and thus perhaps more properly
eligible under recital a, the case is of questionable value.
13. Statutes waiving sovereign immunity are construed with great strictness, and only
those who are clearly within their scope may sue. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S.
584 (1941); Klamath Indians v. United States, 296 U. S. 244 (1935); Blacldeather v.
United States, 190 U. S. 368 (1903).
14. Ex parte proceedings were not possible in the Borchard Bill as originally drafted
(See note 6 supra), but as enacted the statute contains no provision requiring the govern-
ment to contest.
15. See comments of Edwin M. Borchard on his draft of the Bill, Susi. Doc. No. 974,
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and the detailed recitals required, no other interpretation seems possible.
Defeated in his attempt to minimize the problem of proof, petitioner then
sought to characterize the proceeding as sufficiently criminal in nature to
require the Government to show that by the terms of the statute the certifi-
cate should not issue. But, pointing to the petitioner as the moving force in
the action, and citing the collection of damages as the objective of the pro-
ceeding, the court held the suit to be essentially civil in character, with the
burden of proof on petitioner. Orthodox doctrines of sovereign sacrosanc-
tity would further seem to support the result reached by the court on this
issue.
The decision does not contain a definitive interpretation of the three recit-
als required in a certificate, but each was covered insofar as it bore on the
issues of this case. The court found that recital a was phrased to cover cases
of mistaken identity,16 and was clearly inapplicable to Keegan who did, in
fact, commit the acts charged. This result is not inconsistent with the Su-
preme Court's opinion, since the reversal was only on the ground that the
acts charged, and committed by Keegan, were not sufficient to evidence the
alleged conspiracy. "Acts charged" in this subsection thus seems to be con-
strued as "overt acts" rather than the "offenses" charged. This appears
tenable, for otherwise the provision would be superfluous, "offenses" being
covered by subsection b, which uses the word in its own right.
In determining, under subsection b, whether Keegan's conduct constituted
a crime, the court was faced both with the reversal on the ground that con-
spiracy was not established, and the Supreme Court's added dictum that the
substantive crime of counselling evasion was not proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.17 The court first cautiously pointed to the difference in the effect of
holdings and dicta, but then held that even were the dictum binding, the
evidence was sufficient to create in the court's mind so strong a belief that
Keegan was guilty of counselling evasion that his innocence could not be
certified. Such independence in the trial court indicates in some measure
the gulf between a finding of "not guilty" in criminal proceedings, and a
determination of "innocence" in a statutory action for compensation. But
62d Cong., 3d Sess. 33 (1913), also letter of Att'y Gen. Homer Cummings to the
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Sax. Rar. No. 202, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937).
16. Cf. Campbell v. New York, 186 Misc. 586, 62 N.Y.S. 2d 638 (Ct. Cl. 1946) ; also
New York Legislature Special Act entitled CLAMU or BERTmA CAPBDELL, N.Y. Laws
1946, c.1, §§ 1, 2. Campbell, a successful stock broker, was mistakenly convicted of forg-
ing a check, and was imprisoned for three years. The forger was later found, and
Campbell, then on parole, was exonerated. He had been unable to resume his former
position, and was just able to support his family. As the New York Compensation Law'
(note 3 stpra) had been passed since his conviction, the Legislature passed a special act
conferring jurisdiction of this case on the Court of Claims. He was awarded $40,000
pecuniary damages and $75,000 for loss of reputation and mental anguish. For a col-
lection of sixty-five similar miscarriages of justice see BORCHARD, CONVIaniN THE IN O.
cmT, note 1 supra.
17. Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478, 494-5 (1945).
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this disparity would have been more dramatically illustrated had the court
chosen to premise the certificate denial on its belief that Keegan was actually
guilty of conspiracy. In other situations it is well settled that findings in a
criminal proceeding are not res judicata in a civil suit,18 and as subsection b
provides in effect that belief that an uncharged crime was committed is
grounds for refusal of a certificate, it might consistently be held that belief
that the charged crime was in fact committed is likewise grounds for denial.
Such reconsideration of the criminal offense itself would seem necessary to
prevent recovery by those whose "innocence is based on technical or proce-
dural grounds." 19
The misconduct on which the court refused recital c indicates in general
the requirements of this subsection. Conduct which increases suspicion of
guilt, such as perjury before the grand jury, would be sufficient. In addition
apparently any conduct, such as the publication of the Bund Command,
which is of such questionable lawfulness as reasonably to justify arrest and
indictment, will similarly prevent recovery. It is notable that, in accord
with the limited purpose of Congress, the misconduct or negligence need
only contribute to the arrest, and may be totally unconnected with the con-
viction.20
Conceptually, the judicial application of this sharply restricted definition
of "innocence" is novel. The somewhat analogous proceeding for the re-
covery of a fine erroneously levied requires only a showing of (1) the errone-
ous conviction, and (2) the involuntary payment.2 1 Here, evidence extrinsic
to the charged offense is required, and this not to establish the well known
status of "not guilty" but to show varying degrees of innocence. The silence
of the statute on vital points of procedure complicates the problem of treat-
ing a man as guilty until proven innocent, in the face of the firmly imbedded
contrary assumption of the criminal law. However, the right to sue the sov-
ereign is granted only on the sovereign's terms,22 and the court applied the
18. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). But only if the proceeding is as-
sumed to be dvil, not criminal. The close relationship of this statutory action with the
previous criminal trial and the punishment there exmcted, in juxtaposition with its civil
nature as a suit for damages, makes certification proceedings md gcncris and without
direct precedent.
19. H. R. REP. No. 2299, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). This civil retrial of the
charge would prevent recovery of compensation on the same evidence which the identical
court found sufficient to support a verdict of guilty. For statutes yielding similar results,
see N. D. Laws, note 4 supra, and Wis. Laws, note 5 mspra (findings of the board to
be based only on such evidence and circumstances as have been discovered since the trial
and conviction).
20. As in the California statute, note 2 mipra.
21. United States v. Mossew, 268 Fed. 383 (N.D.N.Y. 1920); United States v.
Rothstein, 187 Fed. 26S (C.C.A.7th 1911) ; Devlin v. United States, 12 Ct. CL 266 (1876).
22. Reid v. United States, 211 U.S. 529 (1909); Kawnanakoa v. Polyblant 205
U.S. 349 (1907); Finn v. United States, 123 U.S. 227 (1887).
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standards clearly required by the wording and legislative history of the
statute.
The consequences of Keegan's petition perhaps explain the exceedingly
rare invocation of this statute. On conviction of a felony, the right to practice
a profession is usually forfeit; upon reversal it may be restored by an appro.
priate proceeding. Keegan was disbarred in New Jersey, and might well have
expected reinstatement on the basis of the Supreme Court's opinion acquit-
ting him. In the face of the district court's refusal to certify his innocence,
his chance of reinstatement would seem small indeed. His general reputation
will likewise remain impaired. Faced with the task of proving a host of
negatives, only those who are either clearly and completely unoffending, or
are unconcerned over their reputations, dare ask for redress. Unless the
definitions of "not guilty" and "innocent" are made more nearly coexten-
sive by amendment to the statute, the vast majority of those erroneously
imprisoned by federal courts will neither secure nor request compensation.
